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The theory of markets and privacy begins with the understanding that the current 
crisis in the privacy of personal information is a result of market failure and not 
"technological progress" alone. The market failure has occurred because of a poor social 
choice in the allocation of property rights. Under current law, the ownership right to 
personal information is given to the collector of that information, and not to the individual 
to whom the information refers. Individuals have no property rights in their own personal 
information. As a result, they cannot participate in the flourishing market for personal 
information, i-e., they receive no compensation for the uses of their personal information. 
As a fiuther consequence, the price of personal information is so low that information- 
intense industries become inefficient in its use. The price is low because the price of 
personal information does not reflect the true social costs of coping with personal 
information. The market is dominated by privacy-invading institutions. And as a fbrther 
result, there is a disturbing growth in privacy invasion, an excessive and abusive disregard 
for the interests of many in keeping elements of their life private, or at least under their 
control. 
These abuses of personal information are reflected in attitude surveys which over 
the last decade have recorded a growing public distrust in how major institutions use 
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personal information, a wide-spread feeling of frustration and hopeless, and the belief that 
"individuals have lost all control over their personal information." (Equifax, 1996). There 
is a growing anger in American public opinion over the loss of control over personal 
information. 
Like other market failures, the personal information market failure results in 
enormous asymmetries in power and information. For many Fortune 500 firms, personal 
information is a strategic asset. As it turns out, privacy invasion pays handsome rewards. 
There is already today a lucrative market in personal information, but ordinary individuals 
cannot participate in the market (because they have no property interest), they are 
completely mystified about how their personal information is used in the market, and they 
have almost no tools to influence how major institutions use their information. The 
transaction costs for obtaining information by large institutions are small and falling, while 
the transaction costs which individuals incur in obtaining even a copy of their, say, medicaI 
record, are very high. In other words, the tools available to citizens to protect their 
information rights-as few as they are-are too costly to use! Contrast this situation to 
the average person's understanding of the automobile market in the US: trading locations 
are known, seller and buyer rights are fairly clear, information about quality can be 
obtained, transaction costs for buyer and seller are more equal, and disposition of the 
asset is finally decided by the individual. 
* 
The Limits of Privacy Legislation 
A second element to the crisis in privacy is the inability of the society to elaborate 
a set of concepts and policies to rectifjr the market failure. Over the last twenty years, 
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since the landmark report of the Privacy Commission in 1972, the societal response to 
privacy invasion has been a regulatory response driven fiom Washington and State 
capitals. In an effort to correct the market failure, political executives and legislators 
have passed more than twenty pieces of federal legislation, and hundreds of state statutes, 
which attempt to provide individuals with due process rights to their personal information, 
without at the same time, granting individuals ownership rights. 
The regulatory efforts of the last twenty years have attempted to reduce the 
asymmetries in information and power which the market failure creates. Regulatory 
efforts have, for instance, tried to define due process rights for individuals vis-a-vis 
personal record systems. These efforts are informed by a doctrine called "fair information 
practicesy' developed in the late 1960s, an era when only a few large scale national 
institutions possessed national information databases. 
There are two kinds of government regulation in response to market failure 
- 
situations. One type afErms a "natural monopoly" and tries to regulate price and access. 
Public utilities and common carriers fall into this situation. The other kind of government. 
regulation attempts to introduce competition, create a marketplace, and reduce the market 
power of large institutions. Unfortunately, privacy legislation of the last twenty years falls 
into the former camp: it reaBrms the market Mure by securing the property interest in 
personal information for the gatherer, and denying ownership to individuals. 
The current privacy legislation perpetuates a central dilemma of the information 
age: how can we live in a society where individuals can have as much information privacy 
/ 
as they want, and yet where the economic benefits of using personal information in 
commerce are optimized? 
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The Legal and Economic Foundations For Individual Ownership of Personal 
Information 
An earlier paper attempted to lay the legal and economic foundation for a true 
marketplace for personal information (Laudon, 1996) In this marketplace, individuals 
would retain the ownership in their personal information and have the right, but not the 
obligation, to sell this information either to institutional users directly, or, more likely, to 
information intermediaries who would aggregate the information into usefid tranches (e.g. 
blocks of one thousand individuals with known demographic characteristics) and sell these 
information baskets on a National Information Exchange. 
Individual ownership of personal information can be anchored within British and 
American common law. The common law tort of appropriation protects the right of 
celebrities to own their images, likenesses, voices, - and other elements of their persona. To 
appropriate personal images of celebrities for commercial purposes without consent or 
payrnent is recognized by the courts as an appropriation. Liewise, it is conceivable that 
courts and juries could be convinced to protect the personal "data images7' of ordinary 
citizens. These data images have somewhat less resolution than a photographic image, but 
they are increasingly and profoundly descriptive and predictive of human behavior. As 
computers extend their powers, these data images wili approach photographic resolutions. 
The economic foundation for individual ownership of personal information can be 
found in the theory of markets (and related theories of governance) and the theory of 
externalities. Markets are likely the most efficient mechanisms for allocating scarce 
resources. Governments should intervene in markets only if markets fail. Markets do fail 
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under conditions of monopoly, asymmetries in power and information, and public goods. 
Governments should either seek to restore markets or regulate the activity. In the case of 
personal information, the market has failed because of asymmetries in power and 
information brought about by poor social choice in the allocation of property rights to 
information. The price of personal information is far too low, and therefore its abuse in 
the form of privacy invasion is far too cost beneficial to those institutions that dominate 
the market. The function of government here should be to restore the power of one class 
of participants in the market, namely individuals, by vesting ownership of personal 
information in the individual. A second function of government is to ensure the orderly 
functioning of a personal information marketplace. 
The failure of the marketplace results in significant negative externalities for 
individuals. These externalities are experienced as excessive indirect and direct costs 
involved in "coping" - with information. Coping costs include tangible costs like 
excessively large mail handling facilities (public and private), and loss of attention, to 
intangible costs like loss of serenity, privacy, and solitude. These negative externalities 
must be balanced against the positive externalities of nearly unlimited exploitation of 
personal information which results in enormous amounts of marketing information being 
delivered to consumers (whether they want it or not). However, it can no longer be 
blithely stated that these positive externalities fully compensate individuals or society for 
the negative costs of unlimited exploitation of personal information. 
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Adding Value Does Not Legitimize Appropriation 
Wormation gathering institutions often argue that a personal name and address has 
zero value. In fact they argue, personal medical, credit and related information also has no 
value per se. The large institutions, for whom personal information is a strategic asset- 
or so they claim in their annual reports- argue that by collecting information on 
individuals &om a variety of sources, and mixing this information with other information, 
they create the value in personal information, and therefore this value belongs all to them. 
In this argument, property results &om the "meat of the brow" expended by gathering 
institutions. 
"Sweat of the brow" is only one element in the theory of property. Actually, the 
largest portion of wealth in America is inherited, not created. Surely "sweat of the brow" 
is a weak theory when it comes to personal intbrmation. For instance, if a thief steals your 
- 
car, fixes the car, paints it, and mixes it with a fleet of stolen cars, then indeed the thief 
has added value to the car and the collection. But these actions by the thief do not 
therefore transfer ownership to the thief To argue that Xormation gathering institutions 
add value to my personal information by compiling, collating and mixing in a database, 
does not solve the question of ownership. To say information gathering institutions have 
exclusive property rights to my personal information because they have added value to the 
information simply begs the question of who owns my personal information. Whether or 
not my personal information appears in a collection, or was mixed with other information, 
is not decisive for the question of ownership. 
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L Research on the Mechanics: How Will Personal Information be Priced? 
a 
The theory of markets and privacy raises many mechanical questions of 
implementation. Currently, with colleagues at New York University's Stem School of 
Business, we are planning research in a number of areas. Here are some interesting 
researchable questions raised by readers of an earlier theoretical paper: 
What would individual citizens deposit in local depository institutions? Their 
"information" or their "information rights." HOW would these rights be transferred? 
What would be included in these rights-the right to use only certain information, all 
information? For what period of time could these rights be sold? 
How would depository institutions or traders on the National Information Market, price 
individual personal information? 
How could people be compensated for the use of their information? How could any 
mechanism keep track of the uses of all this personal information over a period of a year? 
I believe each of these questions has a sensible and practical answer. We are exploring 
answers in a forthcoming book called Privacy and Markets. In this paper, we sketch out 
two lines of on-going research which address the question of information pricing. 
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Finding the Price of Personal Information Baskets 
It is amazing how little is known about the economics of personal information in 
an age when the trade in personal information has become so vital for the conduct of 
efficient markets and transaction systems. Currently we are pursuing two lines of research: 
(1) what are the economics of existing personal information markets, and (2) experimental 
simulation of market pricing mechanisms to test various formal models of pricing. 
(1) the economics of existing personal information markets. In this "information 
economy" about 65% of the GDP is generated in the "information sector" and about 70% 
of the labor force is engaged in "ii6ormation processing" activities (which does not include 
lower level service activities). The precise role of personal information in the information 
sector-as opposed to all other kinds of information on things and places-is not known 
but it can be assumed to play an important role. The FIRE (Fiance, Insurance, Real- 
estate) industry is one of the largest generators and users of personal information, 
accounting for 1.1 trillion dollars in GDP, over 500,000 establishments and seven million 
employees. Even here, there is no accounting of the dollar amount of personal 
information trade. The Statistical Abstract of the United States does not have an index 
entry for "personal information," or for "information." How odd this all seems as we 
enter the "Age of information." 
Everyday trained professionals buy and sell enormous baskets of information on 
millions of individuals in the form of mailing lists, computer data files, demographic 
information, and locational information. We know that governments, credit granting 
institutions, insurance h s ,  and credit reporting agencies are the major sellers of personal 
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information, as well as the major purchasers. We know that this trade in personal 
information involves billions of dollars in trade. And yet we don't know the total size of 
this trade, how traders decide the purchase and selling prices, or even how much a driver 
record, medical insurance, or credit record is really "worth." 
One l i e  of our research is therefore is a series of interviews and questionnaires 
aimed at professional information brokers in the FIRE and marketing industries, The aim 
of this research will be to understand the size, structure and operation of the existing 
marketplace in personal information, and to understand the underlying pricing strategies of 
market participants. 
(2) Experimenting with the economics of future personal information markets: 
finding the price of information 
On one Internet site, people are paid to read advertisements, and to reveal their 
- 
personal preferences. More sites like this can be expected and are a harbinger of future 
information markets in which individuals are paid for revealing information about 
themselves. In fact, personal information markets are springing up all around us in 
response to the reticence which individuals feel about giving away personal information. 
In another unobtrusive information market, customers at supermarkets are given 
"discount cards" scanned at every purchase. The scanned information contains their 
personal name, as well as all purchase information. The information is then sold to 
marketers and manufacturers. Customers receive payments in the form of store discounts 
on selected items (which people truly want) and other "payments" in the form of product 
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promotions sent to their home, or unsolicited phone calls to their home (which most 
people do not want). 
How do ordinary people decide the purchase and selling prices of their or other 
personal information? We will be pursuing answers this question at the Economics 
Laboratory at NYU's Department of Economics. Using student subjects, we will create 
a market place in which baskets of personal information having variable attributes of 
demography, accuracy, and currency can be traded by student subjects (See the article by 
Hal Varian 1996 in this collection). At the end of the experiment, subjects will be allowed 
to keep their trading profits, a nominal reward for participation. 
Using this data we hope to test various formal models of information pricing. The 
pricing of personal information is probably no different fi-om the pricing of other kinds of 
information. Students must answer this question every day: how much is the basket of 
infbrmation called a "college degree7' really worth? My MBA students continually worry 
- 
about this question: will I ever earn back the $50,000 dollars which an MBA degree costs? 
What formal models do we have to answers this question, and to test in the laboratory or 
against real-world data? 
(a) discounted cashf7ow methuuk with no learning. Students and experts tend to see the 
value of college degrees, and perhaps all baskets of information, as a rather linear return 
on investment problem, in which the worth of information today is equal to the discounted 
cash flows which the information will produce over a period of time. Or 
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Where NPV = the net present value of information 
co = the cost of information at the start )t=O) 
A, = the cash flow at the end of the period t 
T = the number of years we are calculating returns 
r = the risk based discount rate based on the rate of return for investments 
with similar risk. 
This model assumes the possession of information today does not ready influence the 
possession of information in the future, and therefore it assumes a linear view of the 
information valuation and acquisitii process (See Figure 1). 
- 
Figure I 
A simple discounted cash flow linear model of information value 
TI T5 
I I I I I 
Revenue: 0 10 10 10 10 
Cost: 100 
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Whenever people value a college degree in terms of the its h r e  income producing 
potential, they typically are using a discounted linear cash flow model. Similarly, 
information brokers in a marketplace might price information baskets based entirely on the 
expected future cash flows associated with the basket of information. 
(b) discounted cashflaw with c'leaming" efJects. While the acquisition of knowledge and 
information can be serendipitous, abrupt, and unexpected, it is often cumulative. That is, 
learning a piece of information now will help you learn more information in the future. 
See Figure 2. 
Figure 2 
Discounted cash flaw model with learning 
- 
TI T5 
I I I 
Information gathered at TI  returns revenues over the 
period TI -T5; but it also permits learning new information 
at T3, which returns addtional revenues in the periods T3'-T5'. 
The total value of the information learned at T I  is therefore 
greater than the returns from that single basket of information. 
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People and organizations do learn sometimes, they accumulate information, store it in the 
form of learned routines, and occasionally act on what they have learned. This would 
suggest a branching problem in which the value of information today is actually much 
greater than the cash flows produced by that single basket of information. Instead, we 
need to increment the discounted value of a single basket by an amount equal to the value 
of &re information that might be learned (and which could not be learned or acquired if 
the initial basket of information was not purchased). Dos Santos has suggested a two 
stage discounted cash flow model that could be usefbl in predicting how individuals value 
information baskets: 
NPV= -Cf + Bd(l+r) + E(Vssp)/( l+r) 
Where E(Vssp) = the expected value of second stage learning 
and E(Vssp) =PI  (bI/l+r) + 132 o.?z/l+r) - Cs 
Where: 
Pi = probability that state i occurs 
bi = expected revenues generated from the information 
Cs = cost of obtaining the information in the second stage 
In this instance, when students say "the finance course I take today will help me make a 
killing on stock options after I graduate ...." they are using some sort of two-stage 
discounted cash flow model to establish the value of information. So also information 
brokers in a marketplace might pay a great deal more than net present value for 
information baskets based on returns from a single basket. Instead, brokers might pay a 
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"learning premiumy' in the belief that what personal information they buy today about 
individuals will allow them to learn even more about these same individuals in the future. 
(c) discounted cash flow with "learning" effects and "loss avo ihce  ". So far 
we have assumed that individuals are forced to learn in the second stage. In fact, once 
people know a little information, they can decide whether or not to learn more and how 
much to spend on learning it. So, for instance, students will say "I don't know if1 should 
seek a position in Europe or the US. I will take some courses first, and then I'll decide 
that when I "get there." If I need additional courses to meet some requirement, I will 
take the courses when needed." When students "get there" they may find that one option 
is worth 0, and another option is worth some positive number. They will choose the 
option with the highest benefits and avoid losses or zero benefits. See Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 






TI Missed Opportunity 
1 I Gain= 0 
T5 '" 
Losses 
T5" Loss=I ,000,000 
In this more complicated model, learning poses the prospect of both gains 
and losses. The price oftoday's information is not simply equal to its future 
revenues, but instead reflects both future revenues, additional learning, and 
loss avoidance. 
Learning poses many hazards. One might learn the wrong thing, or put learning to 
the wrong ends. In teaching a course on business ethics, the faculty often point out to 
students that what they learn in business school could indeed lead to being in a position to 
make just the right decision at the right time, and to make a great deal of money. Or, 
alternatively, what they learn today could lead directly to Club Fed, that federal 
penitentiary system established for white collar felons. Sometimes, people learn the wrong 
things, or learn the right things but apply them to the wrong ends. The point of learning is 
in part to avoid k r e  loss. People may pay a considerable amount to avoid a loss. 
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Dos Santos provided a modified version of two stage discounted cash flows by setting the 
revenues of the second stage learning to: 
bi = Max[O, @i/(l+r) - Cs] 
In this formulatioq the value of information learned now is greater than merely the 
summation of discounted cash flows in the first two time periods. The value of 
information is greater by an amount equal to the value of avoiding a loss or a zero return 
on the cost of investing in new information. Information brokers in an information 
marketplace might pay a "loss avoidance" premium for information which they thought 
could help them avoid future losses. For instance, knowing the DNA information for a 
basket of individuals would be very useM and valuable for employers and insurers because 
it could great decrease future losses, or at least permit adjusting the cost of insurance to 
personal risk. 
(4 Options models. Discounted cash flow models, no matter how modified, have 
limitations. AU possible outcomes are assumed known, the probabiiv of each outcome is 
known, and the value of each outcome is known. Also most troublesome is the selection 
of the discount rate which has a powefil effect on economic benefits. One is supposed to 
choose a discount rate of roughly equivalent market risk. The risk of buying various kinds 
of information is not well understood. 
One possibility is to consider the price of a basket of information today as an 
option on future revenue streams which will come &om the use of that information in the 
future. A call option gives the holder the right to purchase a share of stock for a set 
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exercise or strike price in the kture. The real market price of the stock may be much 
higher than the stock price because it either pays dividends or simply has a current value 
greater than or equal to the exercise price. Of course, there's always the risk that the 
stock value will decline lower than the strike price, and hence the option will be worthless. 
Likewise, buying a basket of information today is like buying an option on future 
uses of that information. Just like a stock option, the owner of an information basket may 
not exercise the option if, at the time of the exercise date, the expected revenues are less 
than the exercise price. So, for instance, when students say, "I don't know what will be 
'hot' five years from now-investment banking or corporate finance-so I plan to take a 
wide variety of courses and be ready to move in either direction when the time comes," 
they are unconsciously invoking an options model to evaluate the "worth" of today's 
information. They are in effect buying an option (paying $50,000 to purchase MBA 
courses) on an underlying asset (their future possibk careers) in the belief that at some 
h r e  point they will be able to make a judgment or decision which will produce returns 
of some sort. 
Options models are useful to consider because (a) the price of options reflects the 
riskiness of the underlying security, and (b) they reflect the ability of individuals to make 
decisi-ons about kture information gathering costs over time. A model for pricing options 
as been developed by Black and Scholes, and a modification of that work by Margrabe 
offers the possibility to extend the original model to a situation where one risky asset 
(information gathering costs) for another risky asset (future revenues &om baskets of 
information). These models are beyond the scope of this paper but are described in Dos 
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Santos. In options models, the price of the option is related to the underlying variance of 
the security or stock. The greater the variance, the greater the price of the option because 
the potential rewards are greater. This is opposite of the case with discounted cash flow 
models where variance of fbture revenues decreases today's value. Options models will 
probably overestimate the price of some personal information, but they may be quite 
accurate for other kinds of information. For instance, for certain types of information 
which does not change mucksay for instance name and social security information-- 
market brokers would probably pay little using an options model. However, for 
information which has great variance and where currency is important -like say medical 
condition-brokers might pay a lot. 
(e) information and co-specialized information assets. The value of a basket of 
information is probably a non-linear function of the number of information dimensions 
- 
which characterize the basket. This seems to defl the law of diminishing returns. Few 
things defl the law of diminishing returns. Networks may be one such phenomenon. It 
costs close to zero to add another person to a computer network, or telephone network, 
but the margin revenues or other gains are substantially greater than zero. Brands may 
follow a similar pattem: the more people who use Microsoft Windows the more valuable 
the operating system (and Microsoft) become. 
Personal information baskets may have network features. We might think of 
information baskets as interconnected network nodes, and the more nodes we have the 
more valuable he whole package. A name and address, by itself, has little value. A name, 
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address, and occupation, has considerably more value; name, address, occupation, zip 
code, medical history, driver history, and credit record probably has a much higher market 
value. The more dimensions included in the basket, the greater the value by some 
exponent. At some point of course the cost of finding out more information exceeds the 
expected returns. 
There are several implications. An individual person who sells rights to hidher 
information should charge considerably more for selling the "complete persona7' than 
should be charged for, say, just a medical record, or credit history. A buyer of the 
complete persona should be willing to pay a great deal more than for small bits and pieces 
of the person, especially given the likely high gathering costs for small chunks of personal 
information which later must be collated with other information. 
An interesting situation arises for holders of information assets. For instance, if an 
- 
employer already holds job performance and psychological evaluation information on an 
employee, along with demographic data, how much would the employer be willing to pay 
for additional dimensions of employee persona like medical records, DNA records, credit, 
and so forth. Obviously the value of information on hand (co-specialized assets) would 
be greatly enhanced through the purchase of a few more pieces of information. But the 
sellers of personal information would not know this fact. In other words, holders of 
information are advantaged in the marketplace, and the buyers are better off than the 
sellers because the buyers total information value will greatly expand by purchasing just a 
few pieces of infbrmation and mixing it with information already on hand. The sellers will 
not know this. The best strategy for sellers will be to sell the "whole persona" rather than 
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sell bits and pieces. The best strategy for buyers will be to avoid buying the "whole 
persona" and instead to buy bits and pieces. 
Conclusion 
It is unclear at this time which of the four models (a-d) are most usem in 
characterizing how people evaluate the price of information, or which strategies will 
emerge in future information markets. As Tversky and Kahneman have discovered, 
people overestimate the risks of extremely rare events (shark attacks) and greatly 
underestimate the risk of likely events (having an accident on the way to the beach). 
Likewise, people may underestimate the h r e  value of information gathered today 
relative to the value of its future uses, and overestimate the cost of today's information 
gathered today relative to its future value. We simply don't know how people in fact 
behave in information markets. Ewe to hope to understand privacy in our time, we will 
have to understand the market mechanisms which shape the flow of personal information. 
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